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SETTING THE STAGE

A.

Purpose

This article examines the en banc' proceedings of the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals (Circuit) for the years 1989 and
1990.2 The examination was stimulated by recent claims, ob-

servations and suggestions that, as a consequence of "Reaganera" appointments, a dramatic philosophical shift has occurred
among the federal circuit courts of appeals judges' use of such
hearings. Some claim that "Reagan judges" consistently vote
as a block on cases having significant social and political implications. Others claim that the judicial voting behavior reflects
a conservative majority, which if unhappy with a decision made
by the liberal minority, uses its en banc power to overturn the
1. "En banc" means "in the bench." Note, En Banc Review in Federal Circuit
Courts: A Reassessment, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1637, 1637 n.l (1974) (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 619 (rev. 4th ed. 1968)).
2. Technically, an en banc rehearing does not affirm or reverse a three-judge
panel decision made by the court. When an en banc hearing is ordered, the original
three-judge opinion is vacated and the appeal decided anew. An en banc hearing is
heard by the full court in the Eighth Circuit, which presently consists of ten sitting
judges. See Note, Playing with Numbers: Determining the Majority ofJudges Required to Grant
En Banc Sittings in the United States Courts of Appeals, 70 VA. L. REV. 1505, 1506 (1984).
3. It is claimed that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals renders more decisions
in which "Reagan-era" judges vote as a bloc against members of the court appointed
by other Republican and Democratic presidents than any other circuit in the United
States. See Smith, Polarizationand Change in the Federal Courts: En Bane Decisions in the
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 74 JUDICATURE 133, 136 (1990). See also Goldman, Reagan's Second Term Judicial Appointments: The Battle at Midway, 70 JUDICATURE 324, 325 (1987)
(detailing President Reagan's attempt to reshape the federal bench); Wermiel, FullCourt Review of Panel Rulings Becomes Tool Often Used by ReaganJudges Aiming to Mold Law,
Wall St. J., March 22, 1988, at 70, col. 3 (quoting Chief Judge Lay of the Eighth
Circuit: "Newer judges are requesting en banc procedures in routine cases that are
not of great importance").
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decision.4
Commentators have detailed how conservative judges in the
Seventh 5 and Ninth Circuits 6 actively urge their colleagues to
increase en banc decisions. This increase in en banc proceedings was sharply criticized by Judge Edwards in Bartlett ex rel.
Neuman v. Bowen.' In Bartlett, three prior grants of en banc rehearing were denied.8 In a concurrence to the order, Judge
Edwards criticized the conservative dissenters for "politicking"
the en banc decision.9 In a surprising concurrence, Reaganappointee Judge Silberman stated that the use of en banc proceedings was "superfluous" to the certiorari process.' 0 There
is also a growing belief that the voting behavior of the "Reagan
judges" has polarized many circuit court judges."
The claims regarding the political purity and the ideological
goals of the Reagan appointees to the courts of appeals are
based essentially upon three factors. First, the Reagan administration was by almost any standard the most conservative of
the last fifty years.' 2 With a broad-based mandate, the Reagan
White House sought to vigorously advance its conservative
agenda on many social issues including "abortion, busing,
school prayer and affirmative action."'I On its agenda of conservative change or elimination were many social welfare programs started not only under past Democratic presidents but
4.

See H. SCHWARTZ,

PACKING THE COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE

CAMPAIGN TO

REWRITE THE CONSTrTTION 155 (1988) ("Many cases in the District of Columbia
Circuit were en banced because the conservative majority on the circuit led by Judge
Bork was unhappy with the decision, and there are indications that this is happening
in other circuits as well."); Note, The Politics of En Banc Review, 102 HARv. L. REV.
864, 864 n.2 (1989) (citing various authorities critical of "Reagan-era" judges use of
en banc proceedings).
5. Wermiel, supra note 3, at col. 1 (detailing how Judge Easterbrook sought an
en banc rehearing to overrule a panel decision requiring search warrants to be used
to search racetrack employees).
6. Rice, Earl Warren Would Blush, AM. LAW.May/June 1988, at 48 (detailing how
Judge Kozinski has made the en banc proceeding "the ultimate police power").
7. 824 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (per curiam).
8. Id at 1240-42.
9. Id at 1243 (Edwards, J., concurring).
10. Id. at 1246 (Silberman, J., concurring).
11. Smith, supra note 3, at 136.
12. Note, All the President's Men? A Study of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 766, 767 (1987).
13. Id. at 767 n.9 (providing examples of conservative agenda are in note).
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also under former Presidents Nixon and Ford.' 4
Second, Reagan administration officials centralized control
over the judicial selection process in the White House.'"
While working with the Justice Department, which traditionally
handles most of the appointment process, Reagan's administration played a much larger role in recruiting and investigating potential judicial appointees than-had any administration
since the Franklin Roosevelt administration.' 6 The Reagan adwere clearly in
ministration sought nominees whose beliefs
17
line with the Republican party platform.
The Reagan administration did not formally consult the
American Bar Association Committee on the Federal Judiciary
before making an initial selection of a judicial appointment.
Also, that administration reserved the right to nominate candidates the American Bar Association had rejected as "not qualified." 8 The careful attention given to the recruiting process
by the Reagan administration caused one commentator to observe that the procedure was "the most consistent ideological
or policy-orientation screening of judicial candidates since the
first term of Franklin Roosevelt."' 9
14. Id. at 767 nn.9-12 (illustrating the broad based conservative agenda advanced during the Reagan administration).
15. President Reagan nominated 301 district court judges, 83 appeals court
judges, 3 Supreme Court justices, and a chiefjustice. See Note, The American Bar Association andJudicial Nominees: Advice without Consent?, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 550, 551 n. 12
(1990) (citing Office of Legislative and Pub. Aff., Administrative Office of U.S.
Courts, Judgeship Vacancy Report by Circuit and District (Feb. 1989)).
16. See H. CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES: THE APPOINTING PROCESS 50-51 (1972)
("President Kennedy did not involve himself deeply in the selection of nominees to
the federal bench."); see also id. at 89 ([T]he procedures developed by the Eisenhower
administration and the performance under those procedures were markedly like
those of the Kennedy administration.. ."); N. McFEELEY, APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES:
THE JOHNSON PRESIDENCY 14 (1987); see also Note, supra note 12, at 768.

17. See Note, supra note 12, at 768.
18. Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Carter nominated candidates
for the district court that the American Bar Association (ABA) had rated "not qualified." See MCFEELEY, supra note 16, at 14, 73. Typically, before there is a nomination

of a federal district and circuit court judge, the Attorney General sends the name of
the prospective nominee to the fourteen-member ABA Committee. The committee
examines the candidate's legal writings, interviews the candidate, and interviews
judges, lawyers, law professors, and others it believes are able to provide information
regarding the candidate's judicial competence. The Attorney General also sends the
candidate an ABA questionnaire on background and qualifications. The full ABA
Committee votes for a rating, and the outcome is reported to the Attorney General.
19. Goldman, Reorganizing the Judiciaty: The First Term Appointments, 68 JUDICATURE
313, 315 (1985). See also Lacovara, The Wrong Way to PickJudges, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3,
1986, at A31, col. 1.
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Third, the United States Senate, which confirms or rejects all
federal judicial nominees, was controlled by the Republicans
during President Reagan's first six years in office. 2" Consequently, during Reagan's first term, he won Senate approval of
all 160 of his judicial nominees, including conservatives such
as Judge Robert Bork, Judge Richard Posner and Associate
Justice Antonin Scalia. With the loss of Republican control
over the Senate during Reagan's second term, however, the
Senate Judiciary Committee was less ready to approve White
House nominees. For example, it rejected appointment ofJefferson Sessions to the District Court "due to his racially insen2
sitive statements and conduct." '

The combination of wide-spread popularity, centralized executive control over the appointments process, and command
of the United States Senate provided President Reagan with an
opportunity to appoint ideological extremists during the first
six years of his presidency. Assuming he sought to make such
appointments, did he achieve his goal in the Eighth Circuit?
While some believe that outside the Midwest President Reagan may have accomplished his agenda of appointing conservative extremists, the ideological commitment of the
Midwest appointments appears less clear. It has been suggested that moderate midwestern Republican senatorial involvement in the process tempered Eighth Circuit
appointments.22
These are fascinating claims, suggestions, observations and
charges. But how does one go about accurately determining
their veracity? In this case, the author conducted a substantive
examination of en banc decisions rendered by the Eighth Circuit during 1989 to 1990. These decisions which in one way or
another, almost always, involved the entire bench, should provide an opportunity to observe the impact of the Reagan appointive process on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
20. The Democratic Party exercised majority control of the United States Senate
from 1954 to 1980. During this period Republican judicial nominees presented to it
for confirmation may have been less ideologically extreme because of concern they
would be rejected.
21. Note, supra note 12, at 769 n.21.
22. Kornhauser,Judges Hew a HardLine, AM. LAw., May/June 1988, at 43 (special
supplement). "Senatorial courtesy" dictates that the Senate will routinely reject a
nominee opposed by a home-state senator. See Fowler,Judicial Selection under Reagan
and Carter:A Comparison of Initial Recommendation Procedures, 1 Ymu L. & PoL'Y REV.
299, 299 (1983).
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Methodology

Obviously, an observer cannot know precisely what factors
actually affect a judicial decision. The particular types of cases
prevalent within a circuit, the circuit's size, traditions, local
rules, institutional norms or other patterns of behavior all affect judicial decision making.2"
There is, however, a considerable amount of empirical data
available that focuses on predicting judicial voting behavior,
which the author used as background when conducting his
analysis. For example, federal judges who are Republicans
generally vote differently than those who are Democrats. 2 4 Republican judges vote against criminal defendants more often
than do Democratic judges. 25 There is not, however, substantial empirical support demonstrating that the voting behavior
of judges within the same political party depends upon the
president who appointed them. One study found that Carter
appointees voted similarly and "occasionally identically to appointees of previous Democratic administrations.1 26 A recent
study of Reagan appointees concluded that they are not significantly more conservative than their Republican colleagues."
One study conducted during the 1970s, however, concluded
that Johnson appointees were more liberal than either Kennedy or Truman appointees. 28 It is unclear, therefore, whether
the voting behavior ofjudges from the same political party differs significantly depending upon which president appointed
them.
Admittedly, the subjective analysis conducted by the author
does not fully reflect the interaction between the Eighth Cir23. See Solimine, Ideology and En banc Review, 67 N.C.L. REV. 29, 45 n.86 (1988)
(citing Aliotta, Combining Judges 'Attributes and Case Characteristics: An Alternative Approach
to Explaining Supreme Court Decision Making, 71 JUDICATURE 277 (1988)) (attempting to
correlate political party identification, prestige of education, political experience,
prior judicial experience, and particular judicial viewpoints).
24. See Goldman, Voting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals Revised, 69 AMER. POL.
Sci. REV. 491, 495-506 (1975); Goldman, Voting Behavior on the US. Courts of Appeals,
1961-1964, 60 AMER. POL. Sci. REV. 374, 376-83 (1966); Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 AMER. POL. Sci. REV. 843, 845 (1961).
25. See Gottschall, Carter's Judicial Appointments: The Influence of Affirmative Action and
Merit Selection on Voting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 67 JUDICATURE 165, 169-70 (1983).
26. Id. at 173.
27. Note, supra note 12, at 779-92.
28. R. CARP & C.K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND PARTIES IN THE FEDERAL DisTRiCT COURTS 58, 71 (1983).
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cuit judges that lead to a particular decision. However, by
searching en banc opinions for typical partisan issues related
to broader political conflicts dividing conservatives and liberals, a reasonably complete picture should emerge.
The article examines the nature of the particular en banc dispute, the precise language used in the opinion related to the
dispute, and whether the judges were appointed by former
President Reagan. To make the author's analysis easily understood, he chose to label all Reagan-appointed judges as "conservatives" while all non-Reagan-appointed judges are labeled
"liberals." This is a potential weakness in the analysis because
not all judges in the context of the large number of en banc
decisions examined can be fairly characterized as either liberal
or conservative on all issues.
The author hypothesized that conservative judges would
support claims of business while opposing claims of individuals
and public interest groups. 29 Conservatives would be antiunion and more hostile to civil rights plaintiffs and plaintiffs
attacking government officials using Section 1983 actions than
would liberals. In the criminal area the author hypothesized
that the conservative judges would be especially hostile to
criminal defendants. Furthermore, he hypothesized that conservatives would sharply differ with liberals over disputes involving pornography and religion, with the conservatives
supporting the religious perspective in a dispute while giving
little support to first amendment questions involved in pornography matters.
Cases for this study are organized in traditional categories.
For example, criminal cases are gathered in a single section
and analyzed together. The author tried to identify language
used by a judge to describe that judge's perspective on the dispute. The cases were examined to determine whether issues of
exceptional importance posing either actual or potential intracircuit conflict existed. To the extent that this more objective standard was found to apply to a particular proceeding,
the implication that the proceeding was primarily ideologically
driven carries less weight.
Following each en banc discussion are the author's observa29. See Nagel, supra note 24, at 844-45; Note, supra note 12, at 777.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1991

7

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 3
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

tions. His inferences are limited because they rely solely on
the language used by the judges in the opinion under scrutiny.
C.

En Banc Procedure

Normally, three-judge panels sit to decide cases on appeal to
federal circuit courts. 30 Panel decisions are considered decisions of the entire circuit court. An unhappy litigant has fourteen days after a panel decision is rendered to file an en banc
petition for a rehearing. 3 '
En banc petitions, which have existed for nearly fifty years,
are rarely granted. Nationwide, less than one percent of the
courts of appeals' decisions "decided on the merits" are decided en banc. 2
Until 1983, a majority of the judges of the court who were
actively participating in the affairs of the court and who were
not disqualified in the particular case or controversy could order en banc hearings and rehearings. The court, however,
adopted a rule in 1983 that requires an absolute majority of
the circuit's judges to vote for an en banc hearing or
33
rehearing.
One related and presently disputed issue in the Eighth Circuit involves the question of whether judges may request an en
banc hearing when neither party asks for the review. Chief
Judge Lay contends that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
35(b), 40(a), or the Eighth Circuit's local Rule 16(B) does not
30. Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a court or
panel of not more than three judges (except that the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit may sit in panels of more than three judges
if its rules so provide), unless a hearing or rehearing before the court in
banc is ordered by a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit who are in
regular active service. A court in banc shall consist of all circuit judges in
regular active service, or such number of judges as may be prescribed in
accordance with section 6 of Public Law 95-486 (92 Stat. 1633), except that
any senior circuit judge of the circuit shall be eligible to participate, at his
election and upon designation and assignment pursuant to section 294(c) of
this title and the rules of the circuit, as a member of an in banc court reviewing a decision of a panel of which such judge was a member.
28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1982). While the Eighth Circuit apparently requires that membership of the panels be assigned randomly, no statute or rule requires that membership
be randomly assigned.
31. FED. R. App. P. 35(c), 40(a). An en banc court can be convened in lieu of a
three-judge panel, or it can be convened after a panel hears a case but before the
panel issues its opinion. See Note, supra note 1, at 1638.
32. See Solimine, supra note 23, at 30.
33. See McFeeley, En Banc Proceedings in the United State Courts of Appeals, 24 IDAHO
L. REV. 255, 259-61 (1988); Solimine, supra note 23, at 33-38.
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give circuit judges authority to request "a rehearing en banc
after a panel opinion has been issued. ' 3 4 The chief judge observes that over the last twenty years, he is not aware of any
decision of a panel of the Eighth Circuit "being reheard en
banc where only a judge has requested a rehearing en banc
and a party has not so requested it."'3 5 He argues that this

"historical lesson weighs heavily against the advisability of
such a rule."3 6 However, Judge Fagg, whose conservative
views and influence on the Circuit appear very significant, is
not persuaded that the rules forbid sua sponte judicial
reconsideration.3 7
D.

Traditional Purpose of En Banc Proceedings

En banc proceedings serve some practical needs. They help
maintain uniformity within a circuit 38 by resolving conflicts between existing panels. Resolution of issues reduce future intracircuit conflict and leave future litigants with less confusion
about the court's view of a particular issue.3 9 En banc proceedings may also anticipate future conflict with a particular panel
decision with which the circuit's majority disagrees. An en
banc proceeding permits a rehearing of the case by the entire
circuit before the conflict arises. This promotes uniformity
34. United States v. Samuels, 808 F.2d 1298, 1299 (8th Cir. 1987) (Lay, CJ.,
concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
35. Id. at 1299 n.2.
36. lId
37. Id. at 1302 (Fagg, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Judge
Fagg argued in Samuels:
The case is particularly appropriate for rehearing on the merits because the
two active judges on the panel disagreed, leaving the ultimate panel decision
to hinge on the vote of a district court judge sitting by designation. As the
tally stands, five judges now vote to deny rehearing en banc: Chief Judge
Lay, and Judges Heaney, McMillian, Arnold, and Magill.
I believe each judge on this court embraces the view that presidential
safety is fundamental to the constitutional system we are bound to preserve
and protect. I also believe a majority of the judges on the court deem this
case-involving a direct threat to the President's life-worthy of en banc
review. Thus, I can conclude only that the court has based its denial of en
banc review on a consideration wholly unrelated to the merits of this case:
the Justice Department's decision not to seek rehearing.
Id.
38. See Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 271
(1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (The "dominant ends of [en banc review are]
avoiding or resolving intra-circuit conflicts.").
39. See Bennett & Pembroke, "Mini" In Banc Proceedings: A Survey of Circuit Practices, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 531, 535-36 (1986) (noting that "resolution of conflicts is
the central reason for in banc review").
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within the circuit and gives control to a majority of the judges
sitting.40 Theoretically, en banc review is reserved for rare
cases where an intracircuit conflict of exceptional importance
4
exists. '
For a number of reasons, en banc proceedings have not
been favored. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35 reflects
the traditional hesitation, declaring that suggestions for rehearings en banc are "not favored" and "ordinarily will not be
ordered" except to "secure or maintain uniformity" in decisions, or when the case "involves a question of exceptional
importance. "42
By their very nature, en banc proceedings do not promote
efficiency. The large modem caseload handled by the courts
of appeals makes it difficult for each judge to take on the additional workload created by granting en banc requests.43 The
en banc process requires that the judges read additional briefs,
often travel to distant locations, and then hear arguments that
were, for at least three judges, made at an earlier date.44 Furthermore, there are substantial delays in making a final decision in a case and a great deal of time and energy is directed
away from the daily chores associated with operating the
40. See Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. at 270 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). "[T]he
most constructive way of resolving conflicts is to avoid them. Hence, insofar as possible, determinations en banc are indicated whenever it seems likely that a majority of
all the active judges would reach a different result than the panel assigned to hear a
case or which has heard it." Id.
41. See Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941) (upholding the authority of a federal court of appeals to hear a case en banc).
42. FED. R. App. P. 35. The rule, in pertinent part, states:
(a) When Hearing or Rehearing in Banc Will be Ordered. A majority
of the circuit judges who are in regular active service may order that an
appeal or other proceeding be heard or reheard by the court of appeals in
banc. Such a hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be
ordered except (1) when consideration by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions, or (2) when the proceeding
involves a question of exceptional importance.
(b) Suggestion of a Party for Hearing or Rehearing in Banc. A party
may suggest the appropriateness of a hearing or rehearing in banc. No response shall be filed unless the court shall so order. The clerk shall transmit
any such suggestion to the members of the panel and the judges of the court
who are in regular active service but a vote need not be taken to determine
whether the cause shall be heard or reheard in banc unless a judge in regular active service or a judge who was a member of the panel that rendered a
decision sought to be reheard requests a vote on such a suggestion made by
a party.
43. See Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARv. L. REV. 542, 582 (1969).
44. See id. (discussing the burdens placed on both the judiciary and the litigants).
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circuit.45
En banc proceedings may interfere with judicial personal
and working relationships. En banc reviews may be viewed by
some judges as undermining their panel decisions. They may
also highlight and institutionalize fundamental conflicts among
the judges. Overuse may promote divisiveness, undermine
collegiality, and reduce public confidence in the judiciary.
The most severe damage to collegiality may occur when en
banc proceedings are used to advance ideological ends. For
example, judges seeking to foster a particular ideological perspective may resort to open politicking for votes among members of the court. Collegiality may also be injured when en
banc reversals are viewed as a vote of no confidence in the
three-judge panel that earlier decided the appeal or as "gratuitous intermeddling. ' '4 6 Given the limited reasons for ordering
en banc rehearings, and the potential adverse consequences
associated with granting them, it is surprising to find that the
Eighth Circuit apparently hears more en banc cases per year
than any federal court of appeals in the nation.4 7
E.

The Court's Composition

The United States Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals covers
seven states.48 It has ten male judges49 who serve life tenure.50
Six of the present judges were appointed by former President
Reagan,5 1 one by President Bush,52 two by former President
45. See id.
46. See Kaufman, Do the Costs of the En Banc Proceeding Outweigh its Advantages?, 69
JUDICATURE 7, 57 (1985) (suggesting that en banc review be substantially curtailed
and limited to the "rarest circumstances").
47. See Study Finds 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Most Polarized,St. Paul Pioneer Press,
Feb. 15, 1991, at 2c, col. 1.
48. Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota and South
Dakota.
49. A woman has never been appointed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
50. The introductory pages of the most recent bound volume of the second series of the Federal Reporter contains a current listing of the members of a particular
circuit and their dates of appointment.
51. John R. Gibson, Kansas City, Missouri (Mar. 30, 1982); George G. Fagg, Des
Moines, Iowa (Oct. 1, 1982); Pasco M. Bowman, II, Kansas City, Missouri (uly 19,
1983); Roger L. Wollman, Pierre, South Dakota (July 22, 1985); Frank J. Magill,
Fargo, North Dakota (Mar. 4, 1986); Clarence A. Beam, Lincoln, Nebraska (Nov. 9,
1987).
President Reagan appointed nearly half of the active federal circuit court judges.
See H. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, at 150. Reagan appointees currently hold majorities
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Carter 3 and one by former President Johnson.54 With six
Reagan appointees and one Bush appointee, the conservatives
enjoy a clear majority. During the two year period examined
by the author, Judge Gerald W. Heaney, 55 Judge Donald R.
Ross, 56 Judge Myron Bright 5 7 and Judge Floyd R. Gibson5'
played roles in some of the en banc proceedings. Judge Heaney was particularly active in several decisions considered by
the Eighth Circuit during this period, despite his senior status.
F.

Pre-1989 Studies

Pre-1989 studies of the Eighth Circuit indicate that the Reagan-appointed majority was exercising a conservative influence
in the circuit. The conservative wing reached holdings inconsistent with those of the liberal panel in some cases involving
politically controversial issues.59 For example, in 1985, the
Eighth Circuit split evenly in three successive en banc rehearings along roughly appointive lines.6'
The 1987 to 1988 en banc proceedings are consistent with
in the District of Columbia, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth
circuits.
52. James B. Loken, St. Paul, Minnesota (Oct. 17, 1990).
53. Theodore McMillian, St. Louis, Missouri (Sept. 23, 1978); Richard S. Arnold,
Litde Rock, Arkansas (Feb. 20, 1980).
54. ChiefJudge Donald P. Lay, St. Paul, Minnesota (July 22, 1966).
55. President Johnson appointed the Honorable Gerald W. Heaney on November 3, 1966. Judge Heaney assumed senior status on December 31, 1988. This article does not analyze the extent to which appellate judges of senior status can vote to
rehear cases en banc and participate in the rehearing, or what vote is necessary if a
judge disqualifies himself. See, e.g., Arnold v. Eastern Air Lines, 712 F.2d 899 (4th
Cir. 1983) (en banc) (effect of recusal ofjudges), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984);
Comment, In Banc Procedures in the United States Courts of Appeals, 43 FORDHAM L. REV.
401 (1974).
56. The Honorable Donald R. Ross took senior status on June 13, 1987. Judge
Ross was appointed by former President Nixon on December 12, 1970.
57. Judge Bright, a senior circuit court judge, was appointed by former President
Johnson on June 7, 1968.
58. Judge Gibson was appointed to the Eighth Circuit by President Johnson on
June 8, 1965.
59. See Solimine, supra note 23, at 62-64.
60. See Williams v. Butler, 762 F.2d 73 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (per curiam) (55, five Democratic appointees voting to affirm, four Republican appointees plus one
Democratic appointee voting to reverse), vacated, 475 U.S. 1105 (1986); Ozark Air
Lines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 761 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (per
curiam) (same alignment, splitting over an arbitrator's decision that the board of adjustment had jurisdiction to consider pilots' eligibility for occupational injury leave
under a collective bargaining agreement), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1985); Hill v.
Lockhart, 764 F.2d 1279 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (per curiam) (evenly divided,
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the 1985 observation. The judges split their votes along appointive lines in en banc matters and, by 1988, the conservatives were in control of the circuit. 6 ' This article will examine
en banc proceedings that occurred in 1989 and 1990.
II.

CRIMINAL DECISIONS

The largest number of en banc proceedings in the Eighth
Circuit during 1989 to 1990 involved criminal matters. The
following is a summary of the en banc criminal disputes.
62
A. United States v. Jacobson

Keith Jacobson was convicted of one count of receiving child
pornography though the mails. His defense at trial and upon
appeal was entrapment. A three-judge panel consisting of two
liberal Johnson-appointees, Chief Judge Lay and Judge Heaney, clashed head-on with conservative Reagan-appointee,
Judge Fagg, over the conviction. The liberals concluded the
government had entrapped Jacobson and reversed the conviction.63 Judge Fagg dissented. 64
Judge Heaney wrote the panel majority opinion and explained the reversal in the following manner:
Our view is threefold: (1) the Electric Moon purchase was
not evidence of predisposition and did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that Jacobson
though the alignment was not specified, denying a habeas corpus claim that a plea
bargain involved a promise of early parole), aft'd, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).

61. See, e.g., Continental Ins. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co.,
842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.) (en banc) ("Damages" clause in an insurance policy held not
to include cleanup costs for hazardous waste sites.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988);
In re IBP Confidential Business Documents Litig., 797 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1986) (en
banc) (court upheld judgment for the plaintiff on libel and tortious interference with
employment claims), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088 (1987); Cody v. Hillard, 830 F.2d 912
(8th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Court held that crowding prisoners not violative of the
eighth amendment.), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 906 (1988); Dace v. Mickelson, 816 F.2d
1277 (8th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Panel dismissed section 1983 action; prisoner did not
have a liberty interest in parole.); Hamilton v. Nix, 809 F.2d 463 (8th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1023 (1987) (Court denied habeas relief, errors committed during trial were harmless.); Arcoren v. Peters, 829 F.2d 671 (8th Cir. 1987) (en banc)
(Court held that FmHA officials repossession of cattle did not clearly violate established law with a qualified immunity against a farmer's suit alleging procedural due
process violations.), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 987 (1988).
62. United States v.Jacobson, 893 F.2d 999 (8th Cir.), vacated and rehearden banc,
916 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990).
63. Id. at 1002.
64. Id.
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had committed a crime in the past or was likely to commit a
crime in the future; (2) the government must have reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts before instituting
an undercover operation directed at a person; and (3) since
the undercover operation was improper, Jacobson's conviction must be set aside because there was no evidence of an
intervening act which cured the government's improper
conduct. 6 5
Judge Fagg, in his dissent, charged that Judge Heaney and
ChiefJudge Lay had "declared war on the government's power
to initiate undercover investigations." 6 6 Furthermore, he accused the Johnson liberals of having "barred the government
from obtaining a conviction because the undercover investigation was initiated without 'reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts' that Jacobson had committed or was likely to
commit a similar crime .... 67
Judge Fagg also accused the liberals of creating a new criminal law entrapment standard by borrowing "from the rule of
probable cause to arrest, and from the rule of particularized
suspicion that governs brief investigatory detentions, for the
government's power to inisingular purpose of narrowing the
68
tiate undercover investigations."
The government's request for a rehearing en banc was
granted. After hearing arguments and receiving additional
briefs, the en banc court upheld the conviction, rejecting the
liberal panel's analysis. 69 The Circuit's conservatives were
joined by the two Carter appointees 70 in their affirmance. The
en banc majority suggested that the legal issue used by the liberals who voted to reverse the conviction had not been properly raised:
Jacobson contends the government cannot begin an undercover investigation of a suspected person unless the government has reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts
that the suspected person is predisposed to criminal activity. Although Jacobson did not raise this legal issue in the
district court, both the government and Jacobson were
given an opportunity to brief and argue the issue before the
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 1000.
Id. at 1002.
Id.
Id. at 1003 (citations omitted).
United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467, 468 (8th Cir. 1990).
Judges Arnold and McMillian.
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court en banc. 7 1

Judge Heaney and ChiefJudge Lay dissented from the en banc
72
majority.
Observation: The case was not exceptionally important and en
banc review initially seems unwarranted. However, if one accepts Judge Fagg's proposition that the Johnson liberals were
attempting to create a new Circuit-wide standard unacceptable
to the majority of the circuit judges and auguring future panel
conflict, the proceeding is justified.
Given the subject of the dispute, a criminal conviction involving pornography, and the Circuit's composition, the conservatives' reaction was to be expected. Of additional interest
is the gap between Johnson appointees to the Circuit and the
conservatives-a gap not as apparent when Carter appointees
disagree with the conservatives.
B.

Williams v. Armontrout 73

Judge Bright,74 aJohnson appointee, andJudge McMillian,75
a Carter appointee, granted a writ of habeas corpus for defendant Doyle Williams following a hearing before a panel consisting of themselves and conservative Judge Fagg. The writ
vacated Williams' death sentence, but left to Missouri the
choice of resentencing him for first-degree murder or retrying
the capital murder case with appropriate jury instructions. 71
The liberals concluded that Missouri denied Williams equal
protection under the law by selectively applying State v. Baker 77
7
solely "to affirm convictions.1
Judge Fagg vigorously dissented, arguing that the "holding
that Williams's conviction for a thoroughly brutal and calculated murder must be overturned because he was constitution71. Jacobson, 916 F.2d at 468.
72. Chief Judge Lay and Judge Heaney wrote separate dissenting opinions.
ChiefJudge Lay relied upon Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1975), contending that entrapment is established as a matter of law if the uncontroverted evidence indicates that a defendant was not predisposed to commit a crime. Jacobson,
916 F.2d at 470.
73. 891 F.2d 656 (8th Cir.), vacated and reheard en bane, 912 F.2d 924 (8th Cir.
1990).
74. Senior Circuit Judge.
75. Williams, 891 F.2d at 665.
76. Id.
77. 636 S.W.2d 902 (Mo. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983).
78. Williams, 891 F.2d at 658-59.
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ally entitled to 'a kidnapping-based [felony] murder
instruction,' . . . totally misses the mark."' 79 Furthermore,
Judge Fagg attacked the liberal's decision as one that was "out
80
of focus with a real world view."

The government's petition for en banc review was granted.
After argument en banc, the conservatives, joined by liberals,
Chief Judge Lay and Judge Arnold, rejected the panel majority's decision.8 ' Judges McMillian and Bright, who made up
the original three-judge panel majority, concurred and dissented in part.
Following the en banc decision, the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, the American Civil Liberty Union of
Western Missouri, and the Missouri Capital Punishment Resource Center moved for permission to file briefs in support of
Williams' petition for rehearing. 82 The question of whether to
allow the filing of the briefs generated a heated exchange
among the judges.
A majority of the Circuit refused to grant the amici permission to file their briefs. The denial was justified on the ground
that
[ffor the most part, their briefs address Williams's claim that
the Missouri Supreme Court has committed equal protection violations in murder cases. Because we held there was
insufficient evidence in Williams's case to justify the submission of an instruction on the lesser included offense of felony murder, we did not reach the merits of Williams's equal
protection claim. Thus, the equal protection arguments the
moving parties assert in their briefs are irrelevant to our decision and add no support to Williams's petition.8a
Chief Judge Lay observed in dissent that he "would allow the
filing of the amicus briefs. Having considered the same, I reaf'
firm my vote to deny the petition for rehearing."84
Judge
Bright found "no basis for rejecting their filings. Furthermore,
the amici briefs support the dissent of this writer and Judge
McMillian. Therefore, I believe these amici briefs have
79.
80.
81.
82.
Genfed
83.
84.

Id. at 665.
Id. at 666.
Williams v. Armontrout, 912 F.2d 924 (8th Cir. 1990).
Williams v. Armontrout, No. 88-1342 (8th Cir. Oct. 12, 1990) (LEXIS,
library, Dist. file).
Id.
Id.
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merit.85
Judges Arnold and Gibson also dissented from the decision
rejecting the request that the amici be allowed to file briefs.
Judge Arnold wrote that while he had read the briefs, they had
not persuaded him to change his mind. On the question of
accepting the briefs, Judge Arnold observed:
This is a death case. Such cases command our attention and
careful study in a unique way. Life-anyone's life-is a
transcendent value, and there is no graver or more important judicial function than deciding matters of life and
death. In this situation, we ought not close our ears to any
responsible voices, whether or not we agree with what they
are saying.
Here, the voices are unquestionably responsible. The
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the American
Civil Liberty Union of Western Missouri, and the Missouri
Capital Punishment Resource Center all have substantial
experience and expert knowledge in the field of death-penalty law. We are not required to accept their arguments on
the merits, but we should give them respectful consideration. Refusing them leave even to file briefs is inconsistent
with this duty. 6
Observation: The conservatives on the Circuit acted in a predictable fashion when they rejected the panel's decision granting the defendant relief. Of some surprise is the fact that Chief
Judge Lay and Judge Arnold, both liberals, joined the conservative majority on the substantive issue involving the Writ
of Habeas Corpus.
The dispute between the liberals and the conservatives over
the filing of the amicus briefs, a kind of quasi-civil rights and
criminal law issue, reflects the deeper and identifiable ideologi8 7
cal conflict between Republican and Democratic appointees.
The public airing of this aspect of the case is consistent with
the political views of the judges involved in the decision.
85. Judge Bright, while disagreeing with the majority's decision on the merits,

indicated, after considering the briefs, he would not vote for a rehearing because "a
rehearing will not accomplish any changing of views by the majority." Id.
86. Id.
87. Liberal Chief Judge Lay and Judges Bright, McMillian and Arnold joined by
conservative Gibson, were so upset with the majority's treatment of the briefs that
they wrote a public dissent. The public airing of a request to submit briefs, especially
where two liberal members of the court apparently agree with the conservative wing
on the merits of the dispute, may signal a deeper conflict within the court on socialpolitical issues.
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Hill v. Lockhart8s

A three-judge panel consisting of the two Carter appointees,
Judges Arnold and McMillian, and a conservative, Judge Bowman, could not agree on whether Lloyd Hill, a convicted murderer, should be granted relief on the ground he was
incompetently represented by counsel. The liberals affirmed
the trial court's determinations that Hill's counsel was constitutionally ineffective and that his lawyer's erroneous advice affected the outcome of the plea process. Thus, Hill was allowed
to withdraw his guilty plea.8 9 Judge Bowman dissented.9"
The government's en banc petition for review was granted
and an en banc court affirmed the trial court's decision. 9 1
Judge Arnold, Chief Judge Lay and Judge McMillian, liberals,
were joined by conservatives, Judges Fagg and Beam. The dissenters, Judges Bowman, Gibson, Wollman, and Magill, are all
conservatives .92
Observation: The case is unusual for two reasons. First, in
1985 the Eighth Circuit refused to grant Hill habeas relief.9"
This proceeding seemed to cover much of the same ground as
the 1985 action did, but the court reached a completely different result. Second, two conservatives joined the two Carter
appointees and were responsible for upholding the reopening
of the conviction when the en banc panel met.9 4
88. 877 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1989), vacated and reheard en banc, 894 F.2d 1009 (8th
Cir. 1990).
89. Id. at 702-03.
90. Id. at 704-05 (Bowman, J., dissenting). Judge Bowman asserted in dissent
that the claim Hill presently asserts is identical to the claim he made and a panel
rejected over five years ago in Hill v. Lockhart, 731 F.2d 568 (8th Cir.), aff'd per
curiam, 764 F.2d 1279 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc), aft'd, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). Bowman
contended that the reasoning of that decision, which he argued assumed all the facts
the district court has now found, was persuasive. He also argued that the circuit had
expressly held that counsel's advice concerning Hill's parole eligibility, even though
not entirely accurate, did not amount to constitutionally inadequate performance in
Hill. Hill, 877 F.2d at 704.
91. Rehearing en banc was granted in Hill, and the panel decision thereby was
vacated. On rehearing, however, the en banc court affirmed the trial court. Thus, in
effect, the result reached by the panel decision was sustained. Hill v. Lockhart, 894
F.2d 1009 (8th Cir. 1990).
92. Id. at 1010.
93. See Hill v. Lockhart, 764 F.2d 1279 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (per curiam) (An
evenly divided court, though the alignment was not specified, affirmed the district
court decision denying a habeas corpus claim that a plea bargain involved a promise
of early parole.), aff'd, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
94. Hill, 894 F.2d at 1009-10.
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A possible inference is that the Carter liberals have better
relationships with the conservatives than do the Johnson liberals. Therefore, they are able to occasionally obtain support
from some of the conservatives on important issues. Another
possible inference is that the conservatives are moderate
Republicans, rather than extremists.
D.

United States v. Kroh 95

John A. Kroh, Jr., was convicted of thirteen bank fraud
charges 96 by a jury and sentenced to concurrent maximum
sentences on all counts, the longest of which was ten years.97
He appealed the convictions, asserting numerous grounds for
reversal. A divided three-judge panel of Chief Judge Lay and
Judges Magill and Bowman considered the verdict. Liberal
Chief Judge Lay and conservative Judge Magill voted to reverse all of Kroh's convictions, basing their action on the
ground that the government's use of Kroh's guilty plea during
trial was prejudicial error.98 Judge Bowman wrote a lengthy
dissent.'
The Eighth Circuit granted the government's petition for rehearing en banc, vacating the original panel decision. The en
banc court rejected the panel's decision and affirmed all thirteen convictions. 00
Chief Judge Lay was joined in dissent by Carter-appointee
Judge McMillian and conservative Judge Magill. Chief Judge
Lay charged the majority with conducting an unfair analysis
and accepting the government's superficial motive for using
the guilty plea. The Chief Judge stated:
The majority condones the principle that when a defend95. 896 F.2d 1524 (8th Cir.), vacated and reheard en banc, 915 F.2d 326 (8th Cir.
1990).
96. Kroh was convicted on one count of conspiracy to submit false statements to
federally insured banks, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988), three counts of making false statements to federally insured banks, 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1988), four counts of causing
interstate wire transmissions of money fraudulently obtained, 18 U.S.C. § 1343
(1988), four counts of interstate transportation of money in execution of a scheme to
defraud, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1988), and one count of receiving and possessing money
that had crossed state lines after having been unlawfully taken, 18 U.S.C. § 2315
(1988).
97. Kroh, 896 F.2d at 1526.
98. Id. at 1534.
99. Id. at 1534-42.
100. 915 F.2d 326, 328 (8th Cir. 1990).
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ant is charged with conspiracy the government may in its
case-in-chief offer a guilty plea of a co-conspirator, even
though the plea necessarily implicates the defendant, as
long as the trial judge gives a cautionary instruction. The
cautionary instruction informs the jury that the plea is not
to be considered as substantive evidence of a defendant's
guilt but only goes to the witness's credibility. The unfairness of such a superficial analysis obliterates any reasonable
sense of fairness. This is particularly true when the obvious
purpose of the government is not to adduce factual evidence of the conspiracy nor to supply other needed evidence, but simply to bring to the jury's attention the guilty
plea of the alleged co-conspirator of the defendant. This
court now allows the prejudicial use of the guilty plea without any exacting analysis of the government's tactic in calling an alleged co-conspirator
for the primary purpose of
0
eliciting the guilty plea.' '
Chief Judge Lay continued:
Far more troubling than the trial court's decision to allow
the government to question George Kroh about his guilty
plea in the first instance is the majority's ready acceptance
of the government's superficial explanation that it had a legitimate motive for using the guilty plea. The majority fails
to show what the Fifth Circuit describes as their 'deep sensitivity to the possibilities ofprejudice caused by allowing a
jury in a criminal case to consider evidence of a co-defendant's guilty plea.' ...

I believe the record, taken as a whole,

clearly shows that the government offered George
Kroh's
02
guilty plea as evidence of the defendant's guilt.'
ChiefJudge Lay's dissent was written vigorously hoping that
all trial judges will exercise great care when using guilty pleas
against co-conspirators. The underlying theme of his dissent
was that it is the trial judge who must insure the trial's
fairness.

03

Observation: The case appears to be little more than a thirteen-count garden variety conspiracy conviction with the appellate judges examining the government's conduct during the
course of the trial to determine its ultimate fairness.' °4 Conse101.
102.
103.
104.
counts

Id. at 335-36 (Lay, CJ., dissenting).
Id. at 338 (citations omitted).
Id. at 342.
One suspicion is that the conservative majority was affected by the number of
in this criminal case-thirteen.
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quently, justifying en banc review is, in light of the traditional
use of such proceedings, difficult.' 0 5 Furthermore, the case
did not seem to signal a future conflict between intracircuit
panels on an important question of law.
The decision is consistent, however, with the statistically
demonstrated enmity many Republican judges hold toward
criminal defendants. It is also a decision where the gap between Chief Judge Lay and the conservative majority is
apparent.
E.

06
United States v. Watson1

Jackson Rip Holmes, a thirty-seven year old federal prisoner,
was being housed in the general population of the Mental
Health Unit at the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in
Springfield, Missouri. He was convicted of threatening Secret
Service protecteeJeb Bush, the son of President George Bush,
and received a three-year prison sentence.' 0 7 Holmes, along
with another inmate, asked a three-judge panel consisting of
Judges Heaney, Gibson and Bowman to decide whether the
two inmates had a constitutional right to refuse the administration of psychotropic medications.
Johnson-appointee Judge Heaney and conservative Judge
Bowman held that federal prisoners suffering from a mental
disease or defect have a qualified right to refuse such treatment and reversed the district court's order allowing the government to forcibly medicate Holmes.'0 8 The panel then
remanded the matter for a determination of whether Holmes
could function adequately in the prison without medication.' 0 9
Judge Gibson dissented. He argued:
The court today, under the guise of recognizing a qualified
right for these mentally ill prisoners to refuse treatment,
condemns them to nothing more than warehousing. The
continuation of their serious mental disorders, which is a
necessary consequence of the court's decision, is nothing
less than cruel and unusual punishment. In reaching this
105. The defendant received the maximum term on each count, the longest of
these being 10 years. All of the sentences ran concurrently. Kroh, 896 F.2d at 327.
106. 893 F.2d 970 (8th Cir.), vacated and reheard en banc, 900 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir.
1990).
107. Id. at 972.
108. Id. at 982.
109. Id.
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decision, the court selectively reads not only the Supreme
Court precedent, neatly excising and discarding the most
significant portion of it, but also the medical evidence
before the magistrate and district court.11 °
The government's en banc petition was granted,"' the origi2
nal opinion vacated, and the case set for oral argument."1
When the matter came on for hearing, the en banc court noted
that the panel's opinion had been vacated and then dismissed
Holmes' appeal.I"
The panel accepted the government's
statement at oral argument that it had filed a certificate seeking
a district court hearing for a determination of whether Holmes
still suffers from a mental disease or defect that would create a
substantial risk of harm to another if he was released.' '4 The
government claimed that the requested hearing had been
delayed several times at Holmes' request. The government
stated that it had acceded to Holmes' wishes to delay the hearing because Holmes was voluntarily taking an antipsychotic
medication. Additionally, the government chose to defer the
hearing because of the pendency of the en banc rehearing and
the government's anticipation of the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Washington v. Harper.' ' 5 The government asserted that the matter had become moot because
Holmes had completed his sentence. The en banc court
agreed and dismissed Holmes' appeal.'1 6
Observation: This dispute is of no immediate apparent significance. The original panel opinion neither created a major
change in the law, nor generated future intra circuit conflict.
Consequently, it is difficult to justify the instant en banc review
in light of the traditional use of such proceedings. However,
the United States Supreme Court's consideration of a similar
matter gives some credence to the decision to rehear the matter en banc.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 983 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
United States v. Holmes, 900 F.2d 1322, 1322 (8th Cir. 1990).
Id.
Id.
Id.
110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
Holmes, 900 F.2d at 1322.
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F.

United States v. Unit No.

7117

This dispute came to the court for en banc reconsideration
of a three-judge panel decision authored by Carter-appointee
Judge Arnold, joined by Carter-appointee Judge McMillian
and Johnson-appointee Chief Judge Lay. Stanley Carter Kiser
was indicted for conducting a continuing criminal enterprise.I11 The indictment alleged that some of Kiser's property,
including two parcels of real estate in Miami, Florida, and one
in Aspen, Colorado, should be forfeited to the government." 9
After the indictment was filed, the government brought civil
forfeiture actions against the real estate. Warrants were issued
by a magistrate, who made an ex parte finding of probable
cause. Kiser then sought relief in federal district court to release two of the properties from forfeiture so he could transfer
them to his attorney in payment of fees and costs for legal representation. He then petitioned the Eighth Circuit for a writ of
mandamus asking that it order the district court to stay the
criminal prosecution pending determination of his motion to
set aside the forfeiture and pay his attorney. 120 A panel of the
court promptly hold
Eighth Circuit directed that the district
21
an adversary hearing on his motion.'
At the hearing on the motion, the trial judge found that the
proposed attorney fee contract between Kiser and his retained
attorney was reasonable and that Kiser had no other assets not
subject to forfeiture. 2 2 The court ruled the sixth amendment
117. 853 F.2d 1445 (8th Cir. 1988), vacated and reheard en bane, 890 F.2d 82 (8th
Cir. 1989).
118. Id. at 1446.
119. Id. at 1448.
120. Id. at 1447.
121. Id. at 1446. The panel ordered the district judge to
"promptly... hold an adversary hearing on Petitioner's Motion.... Judge
Vietor shall consider Petitioner's financial condition in order to determine
whether Petitioner has assets not subject to forfeiture that could supply a
reasonable fee to the counsel he has retained to assist in his defense in the
pending criminal prosecution. For the protection of Petitioner's Fifth
Amendment privilege of self-incrimination, any examination of Petitioner to
determine his financial condition shall be conducted ex parte and in camera
by Judge Vietor. If it is determined that Petitioner is without assets not subject to forfeiture from which he could pay the fee of his retained counsel,
Judge Vietor shall determine the amount of a reasonable fee for Petitioner's
retained counsel in the pending criminal prosecution and shall decide
whether Petitioner's motion should be granted to that extent."
Id. at 1447 (quoting Kiser v. Vietor, No. 87-2287, slip op. at 2 (8th Cir. Sept. 30,
1987) (order) (Heaney, Arnold, and Bowman, jj.)).
122. Id.
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right of counsel required that the motion be granted to the
extent the properties were needed to pay his counsel. Judge
Arnold wrote:
Due process requires more than allegation and a determination of probable cause that property is the fruit of illegal
drug trafficking before the government can place it out of
reach of a criminal defendant who needs it to pay the lawyer
conducting his defense ....
But the present case involves
more than a deprivation of property simpliciter; it involves a
criminal defendant's loss of the only property he has with
which to hire a lawyer of his own choice to defend him. So
the case involves both the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the Assistance of Counsel Clause of the
Sixth Amendment.... [Kiser] has demonstrated that these
particular assets are the only ones with which he can pay his
lawyer for assisting in his defense to the government's serious criminal charges. He has a fundamental Sixth Amendment right to defend himself against these charges, and he
unquestionably has a Sixth Amendment right (however
qualified) to hire private counsel to aid in his defense. 2 '

The government asked for en banc review of the panel decision. Its request was delayed until the United States Supreme
Court decided two closely related disputes, 1 24 Caplin & Drys26
1
2
and United States v. Monsanto.
dale, Charteredv. United States
The Supreme Court held that a defendant's sixth amendment
right to counsel is not violated by the pretrial seizure of his
12 7
assets.
After the United States Supreme Court's decisions, the dispute was heard en banc.' 2 8 Chief Judge Lay, rejecting the
panel's earlier views, observed:
We are satisfied under Caplin and Monsanto that the district
court's limited order must be vacated. The dissent relates
that Kiser is entitled to an adversarial hearing to vindicate
his sixth amendment right to use of assets for payment of
29
attorney fees. Caplin clearly decides to the contrary.'

123. Id. at 1449-50 (emphasis in original).
124. United States v. Unit No. 7, 864 F.2d 1421 (8th Cir. 1988), reheard en banc,
890 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1989).
125. 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
126. 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
127. See Caplin, 109 S. Ct. at 2651-56; Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2665-67.
128. Unit No. 7, 890 F.2d at 82.
129. Id. at 84 (citations omitted).
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Carter-appointee Judge Arnold and conservative Judge Bowman urged that the en banc judges rule on what type of hearing be conducted. Chief Judge Lay rejected the argument. 3 °
In dissent, Judge Arnold declared:
The important question presented in this case is what process is due to a criminal defendant who is in danger of losing the only money he has to hire a lawyer because of an ex
parte finding of forfeitability. Is a grand-jury indictment or a
magistrate's issuance of a civil forfeiture warrant sufficient?
Or should there be at least a limited adversary hearing, at
which the government would have to show, by analogy to
the requirements for obtaining a preliminary injunction,
some likelihood of succeeding in its claim of forfeiture?
This is the question reserved by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Monsanto. It is the question that was vigorously debated by Court and counsel at the argument before
the Court en banc. But it is not the question decided by the
Court today. The Court decides only that the due-process
issue is not properly before it, though the issue was at the
heart of the panel opinion. Thus this case ends with a
whimper instead of a bang. We will have to face the dueprocess issue another day.' 3 '

Observation: The grant of an en banc hearing was appropriate
in view of the related pending decisions by the United States
Supreme Court. The disagreement between Johnson-appointee Chief Judge Lay and Carter-appointee Judge Arnold
and conservative Judge Bowman was a little unusual. One
130. Id. at 85.
This case serves as a vivid illustration as to why appellate courts should
not pass on an issue not raised or tried in the district court. Kiser's oral
argument on appeal is ambiguous as to what theory of due process he relies
upon: (1) whether an adversarial hearing is necessary to establish probable
cause before seizure; or (2) whether subsequent to the seizure the government must assume, in an adversarial proceeding, the burden to show the
likelihood of success on the merits of the criminal proceeding; or (3) that
the forfeiture of the property is not otherwise improper. If the due process
issue is properly raised in the district court, as it still may be, it would then
be clear to this court what the contentions were and what evidentiary proofs
support those contentions. Suffice it to say no one disputes the fact that the
district court heard none of these claims. The dissent seems to raise another theory of due process: a need for an adversarial hearing to determine
whether the government can show a likelihood of success on the merits so as
to deprive Kiser of his property to retain his own counsel. As indicated, we
feel Caplin and Monsanto dispose of this issue and the issue, at least as stated
by the dissent, is no longer involved in this case.
Id. at 85 n.4.
131. Id. at 85 (citation omitted).
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would have thought that Chief Judge Lay would support Judge
Arnold's view of the dispute.
G.

3
Chambers v. Armontrout1

2

James Chambers appealed his conviction and death sentence. A divided three-judge panel consisting of Johnson-appointees Judge Floyd Gibson,'
and Judge Heaney3 4 and
conservative Judge John R. Gibson could not agree on how effectively Chambers' counsel performed at trial. Liberals Judge
Floyd Gibson and Judge Heaney concluded that Chambers'
counsel for his second trial provided ineffective assistance by
failing to interview or to call a witness who would have testified
that Chambers acted in self-defense." 5 JudgeJohn R. Gibson
sharply disagreed:
The court today concludes that trial counsel Hager's failure
to interview Jones or to call him as a witness at trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland's
tests for reviewing claims of ineffective performance and
prejudice. Because I conclude that neither element of the
Strickland test is satisfied, I would3 6affirm the judgment of the
district court denying the writ.1

The government's petition for an en banc review was
granted. However, the en banc decision came down on the
same side as the original panel decision by a 6-5 vote. 117 Conservative Judge Wollman joined three Johnson-appointees,
Chief Judge Lay, Judges Heaney and Floyd Gibson, and two
Carter-appointees, Judges McMillian and Arnold in the
decision.
Observation: What one sees in these disputes is the occasional
defection from the conservative ranks by one judge. In this
case, that defection gave the liberal wing of the Circuit sufficient clout to block a change the original panel decision. The
defections support the view that the Circuit conservatives do
not hold "extremist" views.
132. 885 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1989), vacated and reheard en banc, 907 F.2d 825 (8th
Cir. 1990).
133. Senior Circuit Judge.
134. Senior Circuit Judge.
135. Chambers, 885 F.2d at 1319-24.
136. Id. at 1324.
137. Chambers v. Armontrout, 907 F.2d 825 (1990).
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H.

United States v. Wilson

38

Jimmie L. Wilson appealed his criminal conviction claiming
that the district court erred when it decided that the government did not violate Batson v. Kentucky. ' 3 9 The district court
held that the government had rebutted Wilson's prima facie
case of race discrimination in the selection of the jury panel in
his criminal prosecution. An Eighth Circuit panel consisting of
Johnson-appointee and Senior District Court Judge Fred J.
Nichol, 14 0 and conservatives Judges Magill and Bright all
agreed that the government failed to rebut Wilson's prima facie showing of the government's racial bias in using all of its
peremptory strikes against blacks on the jury panel.' 4 ' The
government's petition for an en banc hearing was granted.' 4 2
The en banc court, by a vote of 6-5, agreed with the original
panel's ruling. 43 The court held that the government failed to
rebut Wilson's prima facie case of purposeful race discrimination because it did not offer a racially neutral explanation for
striking a black venireman. The matter was reversed and remanded for a new trial. 14 4 Johnson-appointees Chief Judge
Lay and Judge Heaney were joined by Carter-appointees
Judges Arnold and McMillian and one conservative defector,
Judge Bright.
Observation: While the Reagan appointees continue to vote
mostly as a bloc, the defection ofJudge Bright was the decisive
vote. The result of the en banc proceeding was the same as
that of the original panel.
I.

United States v. Neumann

45

Steven Earl Neumann appealed his convictions for bank robbery by the use of a dangerous weapon and the use of a firearm
during the robbery. 1 46 Neumann alleged that the trial judge
138. 853 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1988), vacated and reheard en bane, 884 F.2d 1121 (8th
Cir. 1989).
139. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
140. Judge Nichol was sitting on the panel by designation.
141. Wilson, 853 F.2d at 606-12.
142. United States v. Wilson, 861 F.2d 514 (8th Cir. 1988), rehearden ban, 884
F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1989).
143. United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 1121, 1124-25 (8th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
144. Id.

145. 867 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir.), vacated and reheard en bane, 887 F.2d 880 (8th Cir.
1989).
146. Id. at 1103.
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erred in giving jury instructions and that the judge improperly
commented on the evidence. Neumann also challenged the
scope of the search warrant and claimed he was denied a fair
trial because of the prosecutor's closing argument. A threejudge panel consisting of conservative Judge Magill and two
liberals considered and then affirmed the jury conviction.' 4 7
Judge Magill wrote the opinion, 4 ' with Judges Arnold and
Larson 4 9 reluctantly concurring. Judge Arnold expressed
concern that "the District Court virtually directed a verdict
with respect to at least one element of the crime." 150
Neumann's petition for en banc review was granted15 ' and
the en banc court agreed with the original panel's decision and
affirmed the conviction. 152 One liberal, Judge McMillian, was
the lone en banc dissenter arguing that the trial judge's comments to the jury regarding the evidence "simply went too
far."

53

Observation:This en banc proceeding was unusual. The original panel consisting of one conservative and two liberals all
voted to uphold the conviction. Yet, en banc review was
granted. Consequently, there is little likelihood of ideology
finding its way into the case. This case reflects the moderate
conservative nature of the Circuit on some issues. It also may
reflect the consideration the conservative majority provides
Carter appointees.

J. Stokes v. Armontrout 5t 4
A three-judge panel consisting of Carter-appointees Judges
McMillian and Arnold and conservative Judges Bowman re155
jected Winfred Stokes petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
in the Missouri State PeniStokes was under a death sentence
56
tentiary for a 1978 murder.'

This petition was Stokes' second. Stokes alleged constitu147.

Id. at 1103-08.

148.

Id. at 1103.

149. The Honorable Earl R. Larson was sitting on the panel by designation.
150. United States v. Neumann, 867 F.2d 1102, 1106 (8th Cir.) vacated and reheard
en banc, 887 F.2d 880 (8th Cir. 1989).
151. United States v. Neumann, 887 F.2d 880 (8th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 900.
154. 893 F.2d 152 (8th Cir. 1989), rehk'g denied, 901 F.2d 1460 (8th Cir. 1990).
155. Id. at 153.
156. Id. at 152.
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tional errors in the jury instructions during the sentencing
phase of his trial. The district court denied relief and refused
to grant Stokes a certificate of probable cause so that he could
appeal the court's decision. 157 The trial judge found that any
appeal would be frivolous because the law governing Stokes'
claims was "not susceptible to debate."'5 8 Upon Stokes' motion, however, the Eighth Circuit issued a certificate limited to
one issue: "Stokes's challenge to the jury instructions under
Mills v. Maryland."'159 The panel rejected Stokes' appeal because Stokes failed to raise his Mills claim in state court. Because the record showed no justification for that failure, the
court held that Stokes was precluded from raising the issue
now. The panel affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
habeas petition. "Stokes's procedural default bars him from
raising his Mills claim in a federal habeas corpus
proceeding."160

Following the panel decision, Stokes filed a petition for en
banc review. The en banc review was rejected. Johnson-appointee Chief Judge Lay was the lone dissenter to the en banc
denial.' 6 ' The Chief Judge argued against the panel's procedural denial of the habeas petition. Also, he declared that the
panel improperly placed itself in the position of the jury in rejecting the mitigating evidence. Chief Judge Lay stated:
This court has no right to place itself in the role of the
jury and reject the mitigating evidence as not credible or
not relevant .... The panel speculates that the jury would

have found the death penalty even if it had been properly
instructed. Such speculation does not belong in the law and
obviates an unconstitutional procedural
error which consti62
tutes the height of arbitrariness.'
Finally, Chief Judge Lay argued that the panel's decision
placed "Stokes in procedural catch-22."' 3 Stokes was not
able to raise the issue in the Eight Circuit because of the proce157. Stokes v. Armontrout, No. 88-1809C(6), slip op. (E.D. Mo. Jan. 13, 1989),
aft'd, 893 F.2d 152 (8th Cir. 1989), reh'g denied, 901 F.2d 1460 (8th Cir. 1990).
158. Id. at 5.
159. 108 S. Ct. 1860 (1988). Mills governs mitigating factors considered by the
jury during the sentencing phase of a death penalty case. Stokes, 893 F.2d at 152-53.
160. Stokes, 893 F.2d at 153.
161. Stokes v. Armontrout, 901 F.2d 1460, 1460-62 (8th Cir. 1990) (Lay, C.J.,
dissenting).
162. Id. at 1462.
163. Id. at 1463.
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dural bar and yet the panel decided that a jury would have rejected the mitigating evidence. The ChiefJudge concluded: "I
know of no rule of law that allows such speculation. Certainly,
of reasoning is not warranted in a death penalty
this type
4
case."'

1

Observation: The case illustrates the philosophical difference
between the Carter and Johnson appointees, suggesting that
Johnson appointees are most likely to adamantly oppose the
use of the death penalty because of political conviction, while
Carter appointees possess a more flexible view of the death
sentence. Generally, the conservative judges do not hold a
view that the death penalty is inappropriate.
K In re Search of 4801 Fyler Avenue' 65
The United States appealed a district court order that required the return of property seized during execution of a
search warrant against the Kiesel Company. The warrant was
held by the district court to be constitutionally over broad because it described virtually all16 6property on the Kiesel premises,
both business and personal.

A three-judge panel consisting of Carter-appointee Judge
McMillian and conservative Judges Gibson and Magill split
over the question of whether the district court order should be
reversed. The conservative majority reversed the district court
order.' 67 Judge McMillian dissented. 168 A request for rehear-

ing en banc was filed and denied by the Eighth Circuit.' 69
Observation: The denial of en banc review is consistent with
the views on criminal matters held by the conservative majority
that controls the circuit. No lack of collegiality is evident from
the published case.
164. Id.

165. 879 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1470 (1990).
166. Id. at 386-87. The district court did not suppress the seized evidence, but
required that the government return the evidence to Kiesel and not use it at trial
unless a proper warrant was obtained to again seize the property. Id at 386.
167. Id. at 390.
168. Id. at 390-91.
169. Judge McMillian would have granted the petition for en banc review.
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III.

FARM FAMILY RIGHTS

Zajac v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul

7°

In 1988, a three-judge panel consisting of Johnson-appoin7
tees Judge Heaney and Senior District Court Judge Hanson' '
and conservative Judge Fagg were confronted with a dispute
containing clear social-political overtones in the farming area.
The Zajacs, a North Dakota farm couple, appealed a decision
of the district court holding that the Agricultural Credit Act of
1987 (Act) did not provide them with a private right of action
to enjoin the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul (Bank) from foreclosing on their property. The two Johnson appointees
formed a majority, holding that the Zajacs possessed a private
right of action under the Act requiring the appointment of an
72
independent appraiser.'
Judge Fagg dissented. "For the reasons stated by the Ninth
Circuit in Harper v. Federal Land Bank of Spokane, I do not believe farm-borrowers have an implied cause of action to enforce the borrowers' 3rights provisions of the Agricultural
7
Credit Act of 1987."'
The Bank petitioned for en banc review and the request was
granted. The en banc court did not agree with the three-judge
panel and reinstated the district court decision dismissing the
couple's lawsuit. 74 Carter-appointees Judges Arnold and
McMillian concurred in the opinion 175 while Johnson-appoin1 76
tees Chief Judge Lay and Judge Heaney dissented.
Judge Arnold observed:
The Anti-Injunction Act embodies a fundamental policy
of federalism. It is a limitation on the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, and one that should be scrupulously observed. Exceptions to the Act should be narrowly construed, and doubts should be resolved in favor of applying
it. On this basis, I would affirm the District Court's
170. 887 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1989), vacated and reheard en banc, 909 F.2d 1181 (8th
Cir. 1990).
171. The Honorable William C. Hanson was sitting on this panel by designation.
172. Zajac, 887 F.2d at 845-46. James B. Loken, who later became the first appointment to the Eighth Circuit by President Bush, represented the Federal Land
Bank. Id at 845.
173. Id. at 857 (citation omitted).
174. Zajac v. Federal Land Bank, 909 F.2d 1181, 1183 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1184.
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77

Judge Fagg, writing for the en banc majority, observed:
Having carefully considered all of the Zajacs' arguments,
we agree 'the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Harper v. Federal
Land Bank of Spokane is correct.' We thus join the Ninth and
Tenth Circuits in holding there is no implied private right
available to enforce the Act, and affirm the district
of action
78
court.1
Judge Heaney, writing in dissent for himself and ChiefJudge
Lay, declared:
We are always hesitant to create a conflict between circuits on important issues of the law. This is one instance,
however, in which we should not hesitate to set forth our
own view on the question of whether farm borrowers have a
private right of action to enforce the borrowers' rights provisions of the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987. In my view,
Harper was wrongly decided. 179
Observation: This dispute reflects the distinct ideological gap
between the Reagan and Johnson appointees and offers proof
of the middle-of-the-road view often taken by the Carter-appointed judges. The case involved broad social-political ideology and reflects the polarization between the Johnson and
Reagan appointees.
IV.

SUPREMACY OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN MILITARY

MATTERS

Perpich v. United States Department of Defense

8°

A divided three-judge panel of the court consisting of Johnson-appointee Judge Heaney, Carter-appointee Judge McMil8
lian and Johnson-appointee Judge Thomas S. Fairchild' '
upheld a challenge to the constitutionality of the Montgomery
Amendment brought by Minnesota's liberal governor, Rudy
Perpich. The Amendment restricts the power of state governors to withhold consent to federal deployment of the National
Guard of the United States. 1 82 The district court held that the
177.
178.
1990)).
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 1183 (quoting Griffin v. Federal Land Bank, 902 F.2d 22, 24 (10th Cir.
Id. at 1189.
880 F.2d 11(8th Cir. 1989), aff'd, I10 S. Ct. 2418 (1990).
Judge Fairchild was sitting on this panel by designation.
Perpich sought a declaration of a governor's constitutional authority to with-

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol17/iss3/3

32

1991]

POLARIZATION
Oliphant:EN
En BANC
Banc Polarization
in the Eighth Circuit

Constitution does not require gubernatorial consent to active
States. 18 3
duty for training of the National Guard of the United
84
A divided panel of the Eighth Circuit reversed.'
The court granted an en banc rehearing, thus vacating the
opinion of the panel. The en banc court disagreed with the
panel decision and affirmed the judgment of the district court,
constitutionality
of the Montgomery
upholding the
18 5
Amendment.
Judge Heaney, writing for himself and Judge McMillian, dissented and made the following observations:
With a few strokes of the word processor, the majority has
written the Militia Clause out of the United States Constitution. In so doing, it contradicts the clear intent of the
founding fathers, who believed that state control over elements of the military was essential to a free and peaceful
republic. To this end, they gave the states a degree of
power over the militia, which they intended to be a significant element of our national defense. The majority ignores
the unambiguous language of the Constitution, and disregards the historical construction given to the Militia Clause
and the Army Clause by the three branches of the federal
government and the states. The plain and unassailable fact
is that, until Congress tacked the Montgomery Amendment
on to a defense appropriations bill, it was not responsibly
asserted that Congress had the power under the Constitution to require the National Guard to participate in peacetime training missions without the consent of the governor
hold consent to peacetime training of the National Guard outside of the United
States. Perpich argued the Montgomery Amendment infringes "the Authority of
training the Militia" reserved to the States by the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 16. Further, Perpich sought to enjoin any federal order commanding members of the Minnesota unit of the National Guard to active duty for training outside of
the United States without his consent. Perpich, 880 F.2d at 13.
183. Perpich v. United States Dep't of Defense, 666 F. Supp. 1319, 1323 (D. Minn.
1987), aft'd, 880 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1989), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 2418 (1990).
The district court . . . held that the dual enlistment system, under which
Guard members enlist and serve in both the state National Guard and the
federal National Guard of the United States, was a necessary and proper
exercise of Congress' power to raise and support armies. The court also
held that the States' authority to train the militia did not inhibit Congress'
power to provide for active duty training of the National Guard of the
United States without the governors' consent.
Perpich, 880 F.2d at 13 (citation omitted).
184. Perpich v. United States Dep't of Defense, No. 87-5345, slip op. (8th Cir.
Dec. 6, 1988).
185. Perpich, 880 F.2d at 11.
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of the affected state. 18 6
Observation: This case involved conflicting assertions of sovereignty by state and national governments and the question of
which sovereign would control the military. The conservative
majority rejected the liberal panel's decision and ruled en banc
in favor of the national government.1 7 The opinion reflects a
broad philosophical difference between Judges Heaney and
McMillian and the conservative majority on the question of
federalism and the use of the military.
The question before the Eighth Circuit was legally significant and en banc review was warranted. Given the Circuit's
conservative majority, the outcome of the en banc proceeding
was predictable. Nevertheless, given the importance of the issue, the en banc rehearing was justified.
V.

PORNOGRAPHY

Walker v. City of Kansas City, Missouri'
A three-judge panel consisting of Judges Bowman,
Dumbauld 8 9 and Chief Judge Lay found themselves in sharp
disagreement over the implications of the refusal by Kansas
City, Missouri, to issue a zoning permit. 90
Walker had submitted a rezoning application to the Kansas
City Planning Commission requesting that his property be
granted a District C-X zoning classification, which would permit him to display go-go girls in his drinking establishment.
The Commission recommended approval of the zoning
change, which permitted forwarding Walker's application to
the City Council for consideration. A series of hearings were
held on the application, but over a year passed without a
decision. 19'
Shortly before the City Council denied his application,
Walker brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Kansas
City and its Mayor and Council members alleging that the
defendants had violated his constitutional rights to free
186. Id. at 18.
187. Liberal Judge Arnold did not join in the dissent. Chief Judge Lay did not
participate in the case.
188. 911 F.2d 80 (8th Cir.), reh'g denied, 919 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1990).
189. Judge Dumbauld was sitting on this panel by designation.
190. Walker, 911 F.2d at 96-99.
191. Id. at 82-83.
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speech and due process and the defendants had conspired
to deprive him of his92civil rights. He sought both an injunction and damages.'
Following a hearing on Walker's motion for a preliminary
injunction, which was converted into a trial on the merits of the
case, the district court found no due process violation. However, it held that the zoning ordinance violated Walker's first
193
amendment rights.
After hearings on the scope of relief, the trial court enjoined
the city from enforcing the ordinance against Walker. It rejected his claim for compensatory damages and awarded only
nominal damages.' 94 On appeal, Walker contested the trial
court's dismissal of the individual city council members from
the lawsuit, rejection of his due process claim, limitation of
damages and denial of his motion for a new trial on the compensatory damages issue. The city cross-appealed the trial
court's first amendment holding and the award of nominal
damages and attorney fees.' 95 The majority on the original
three-judge panel, with Chief Judge Lay dissenting, reversed
the judgment for Walker on his first amendment claim and vacated the injunction and the award of damages and attorney
fees. 196
Chief Judge Lay, dissenting in the three-judge panel matter,
was irate:
In my view, the majority improperly reaches issues not
raised by the parties, and then erroneously resolves those
issues.... The opinion in Section II discusses in ten pages
why the Kansas City ordinance as applied to go-go dancing
should not deserve first amendment protection. It concludes, however, that it is not necessary to decide the case
on this basis because the City was within its authority to
deny Walker's application under the twenty-first amendment. Not only is the discussion on the first amendment
19 7
advisory and pure dicta, it is also clearly wrong.
192. Id.
193. Walker v. City of Kansas City, 691 F. Supp. 1243 (W.D. Mo. 1988), aff'd in

part and rev'd in part, 911 F.2d 80 (8th Cir.), reh'g denied, 919 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1990).
194. Walker v. City of Kansas City, 697 F. Supp. 1088 (W.D. Mo. 1988), vacated,
911 F.2d 80 (8th Cir.), reh'g denied, 919 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1990).
195. Walker v. City of Kansas City, 911 F.2d 80, 83 (8th Cir.), reh'g denied, 919 F.2d
1339 (8th Cir. 1990).
196. Judge Dumbauld concurred with Judge Bowman. Id. at 96-97.
197. Id. at 98.
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In a footnote to his opinion, Chief Judge Lay observed that
"[t]he majority, in its dicta discussion of the first amendment,
portrays a personal distaste for Walker's proposed go-go dancing. "'98The Chief Judge ended his dissent with a brief lecture
on the duties of the judiciary, stating, "I respectfully submit
that the majority opinion offends [the] basic canons governing

judicial review."'

99

Walker's petition for a rehearing en banc was denied because a majority of active judges failed to vote for rehearing.
Two liberals, Chief Judge Lay and Judge McMillian and one
conservative, Judge Gibson, dissented from the denial of the

petition for rehearing. 200 Judge Gibson and Chief Judge Lay
wrote separate dissents with Judge McMillian joining both of
them.
Chief Judge Lay, still furious over the panel decision,
observed:
I deem it unfortunate that the court refuses to grant a rehearing en banc in this case. I believe that en banc procedures should be used sparingly on any Court of Appeals.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35 stresses that en
banc cases should be heard only when necessary to seek
uniform decisions or when a question is exceptionally important. Here the issue is one of exceptional importance.
The important question is not, perhaps, as some might
think, whether go-go dancing is a form of expressive speech
protected under the First Amendment. The district court
held that it is protected speech and only Judge Bowman in
his opinion argues that it is not. Neither Judge Dumbauld
nor I agree with his rhetorical disdain of go-go dancing and
the protection it has enjoyed as expressive conduct....
We should grant a rehearing en banc in the present case
because it is the first case in the history of the Eighth Circuit
wherein we reverse a district court on grounds that were
(1) not factually engaged in by the parties before the City
Council, (2) not passed upon by the City Council, (3) not
asserted in the district court, and (4) not briefed or argued
before this court. .

.

. Our court injects into the factual

background of this case, on pure hypothesis, a constitutional ruling under the Twenty-first Amendment, never
considered or relied upon by the parties before the City
198. Id. at 99 n.6.
199. Id. at 99.
200. Walker v. City of Kansas City, 919 F.2d 1339, 1340-42 (8th Cir. 1990).
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Council.... We deserve jurisprudential doctrine when the
20
court creates a supposed justiciable issue out of thin air. 1
Observation: This case reflects a particularly acerbic disagreement between Chief Judge Lay and the conservative members
on the court. ChiefJudge Lay, a constitutional scholar of some
note with a reputation as a first amendment expert, was no
doubt exasperated at the pragmatic view taken by the Circuit in
its panel decision and frustrated at his inability to move some
of the conservatives to his view. The dispute illustrates the
strength of the conservative majority on the court and forecasts for civil libertarians an almost impossible task of obtaining favorable decisions in the first amendmentpornography area. The dispute makes clear however, that
Chief Judge Lay's liberal philosophy has little support among
the active members of the Circuit.
VI.

RELIGION

20 2
Clayton v. Place

A group of students, parents, and taxpayers brought an action against Purdy R-2 School District, its Superintendent, and
members of the district's Board of Education seeking to set
aside the school district's rule prohibiting dancing on school
premises. The plaintiffs challenged the rule on several
grounds, including a charge that the rule violates the establishment clause of the first amendment because it advances the
views of residents in the district who oppose dancing on religious grounds. Following a hearing, the district court agreed
with the plaintiffs and invalidated the rule on that basis.20 3
The school district appealed and a panel consisting of Judges
Fagg, Floyd R. Gibson, and William H. Timbers 2° 4 unanimously reversed the district court decision.20 5
Religion is an important force in Purdy, a small, rural community in southwestern Missouri. Several churches within the
201. Id. at 1341-42 (citations omitted).
202. 884 F.2d 376 (8th Cir.), reh'g denied, 889 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1811 (1990).
203. Clayton v. Place, 690 F. Supp. 850, 854-57 (W.D. Mo. 1988), rev'd, 884 F.2d
376 (8th Cir.), reh'g denied, 889 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1811
(1990).
204. The Honorable William H. Timbers was sitting on this panel by designation.
205. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376 (8th Cir.), reh'g denied, 889 F.2d 192 (8th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1811 (1990).
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community are staunchly opposed to social dancing. "A tenet
of one denomination in Purdy requires 'a separation from
worldliness, including dancing,' and another teaches that 'social dancing is sinful.' "206 Various groups have unsuccessfully
sought permission for school dances and have proposed
changing the school district's no-dancing rule. Purdy students
are not prohibited from holding, and had regularly held,
dances away from school property.2 °7
The question before the three-judge panel was whether the
district court had correctly applied the test found in Lemon v.
Kurtzman.2 °8 The court found it had not been correctly applied. Judge Fagg observed:
The mere fact a governmental body takes action that coincides with the principles or desires of a particular religious
group, however, does not transform the action into an impermissible establishment of religion....
We simply do not believe elected government officials are
required to check at the door whatever religious background (or lack of it) they carry with them before they act
on rules that are otherwise unobjectionable under the controlling Lemon standards. In addition to its unrealistic nature, this approach to constitutional analysis would have the
effect of disenfranchising religious groups when they succeed in influencing secular decisions. In this case, the district court recognized '[r]eligious groups . . . have an

absolute right to make their views known and to participate
in public discussion of issues.' Nevertheless, the court held
'those views may not prevail,' even though these groups
have long been legitimate participants in secular community
debate.
At bottom, the proper remedy for plaintiffs' disenchantment with a Board that refused to change a rule that is compatible with Lemon
is found at the ballot box and not in the
20 9
Constitution.

206. Id. at 378 (quoting Clayton, 690 F. Supp. at 856).
207. Id.
208. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The Lemon test has been consistently followed
by the Supreme Court for determining whether a challenged governmental rule offends the establishment clause.
Under the Lemon framework, a rule is permissible if it has a secular purpose;
if it neither advances nor inhibits religion in its principal or primary effect;
and if it does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion. The challenged rule in this dispute is valid only if it meets all three tests.
Clayton, 884 F.2d at 379.
209. Id. at 380-81.
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The requested en banc review was not granted. Three liberals, Johnson-appointee Chief Judge Lay, and Carter-appointees Judges McMillian and Arnold, were joined by Judge John
R. Gibson in a dissent from the denial of a rehearing. 2 10 Judge
John R. Gibson observed:
The district court's findings of fact demonstrate overwhelmingly that the religious views of five churches in Purdy, Missouri, caused the school board to refuse to change its rule
prohibiting social dancing. These findings compel the conclusion that the test of Lemon v. Kurtzman has not been
satisfied....
This is a case about religious tyranny. The members of
five churches who have strong views on the religious significance of dancing successfully exerted pressure on the board
to prohibit school dances. In the overall scheme of things, a
dance at Purdy high school, with an enrollment of 519, may
not be of earth-shattering significance. Yet, our Constitution protects all citizens, including the students at Purdy
high school, from religious, as well as political, oppression
by a majority. The first amendment rights of those students
sound a call that this court should not ignore. Our denial of
the petition for rehearing en banc turns a deaf ear to the
pleas of those students. 2 1 1

Observation: It is difficult to dismiss Judge Gibson's compelling arguments and concerns over the potential for
majoritarian "religious tyranny" playing a role in the school
board's decision. Such appeals, however, as this denial of en
banc review demonstrates, find little solace with a staunchly
conservative court.
VII.

LABOR

212
Powell v. National Football League

The National Football League (NFL) appealed a district
court order denying the NFL's motion for partial summary
judgment in an antitrust action. The action was brought by
Marvin Powell, eight other professional football players, and
the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA).
210. Clayton v. Place, 889 F.2d 192, 193-97 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1811 (1990).
211. Id. at 193-95 (citations omitted).
212. 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir.), corrected by No. 89-5091, slip op. (8th Cir. Nov. 1,
1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 711 (1991).
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The district court ruled "that the nonstatutory labor exemption to the antitrust laws expires when, as here, the parties
reached an 'impasse' in negotiations following the conclusion
213
of a collective bargaining agreement.1

On appeal, the NFL contended that the challenged practices
were products of bona fide, arm's-length collective bargaining
and thus governed by federal labor law. The NFLPA argued to
uphold the district court's ruling and that the current compensation system may be challenged as an unlawful restraint of
trade.21 4
The three-judge panel in a 2-1 split concluded that the antitrust laws were inapplicable and reversed the district court's
order. Judge John R. Gibson and Judge Wollman voted to reverse the district court, in effect ruling for the NFL owners. 21 5
Judge Heaney disagreed. He charged in his dissent that
"[t]oday, the majority permits the owners to violate the antitrust laws indefinitely.

' 21 6

Also, he thought that the practical

result of the majority's decision "eliminated the owners' fear of
the antitrust lever; therefore, little incentive exists for the owners to ameliorate anticompetitive behavior damaging to the
players.

2 17

The NFLPA petitioned for an en banc review of the panel
decision. The effort was unsuccessful. ChiefJudge Lay, joined
by Judge McMillian, dissented from the denial of the petition. 2 8 The ChiefJudge contended that the case was of significant importance and that a panel decision would now be
important precedent in the area of collective bargaining. He
also contended that the two-judge majority in the panel decision impliedly overruled longstanding precedent. 21 9
Further, Chief Judge Lay observed:
En banc procedures should seldom be invoked. In recent
years I have been critical of this court using en banc procedures to hear routine and insignificant issues. En banc procedures expend valuable judicial energies which should be
used not to correct questionable panel decisions but only to
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

561.
568.
571.
572-74.
572 (citation omitted).
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decide decisions of the utmost importance or to resolve intracircuit conflicts. Here, not only is the issue significant,
but the panel has impliedly overruled a long-standing decision of this court. Thus, in my judgment, this case is among
22 0
the rare exceptions which should be reheard en banc.
Observation: This case is another example of the polarization
on the Eighth Circuit between the Johnson appointees and the
Reagan bloc. Johnson-appointee Judge Heaney dissented in
the original panel decision and Johnson-appointee Chief Judge
Lay was upset with both the panel decision impliedly reversing
a decision he authored and the 7-2 decision against rehearing
en banc. Additionally, the polarization is evident by the fact
that Reagan-appointee Judge John R. Gibson felt compelled to
write a response to Chief Judge Lay's dissent in the denial of
the en banc rehearing.
VIII.

SECTION

1983 ACTIONS

Warren v. City of Lincoln

22

1

This section 1983 action arose out of a confrontation between Jackson Warren, a college student, and members of the
Lincoln police department investigating a burglary. The police responded to a call from a man who claimed someone had
just attempted to break into his apartment through a second
story window. After the attempted break-in, the intruder fled.
The caller described the intruder "as a slender white male in
2 22
his early twenties wearing a white short-sleeved shirt.
One of the responding officers, teamed with a police dog,
tracked the intruder's scent east from the crime scene to where
Warren's car was parked, a distance of four and one-half
blocks. Warren, a slender, white nineteen year old male, was
wearing a light-colored short-sleeved shirt. As the police approached his car, he started his engine but was stopped by the
police. A license check revealed an outstanding traffic violation warrant. He was arrested on the outstanding warrant,
searched and taken to the Lincoln jail where a detective questioned him regarding a number of burglaries and prowling in220. Id. (citations omitted).
221. 816 F.2d 1254 (8th Cir. 1987), vacated and rehearden banc, 864 F.2d 1436 (8th
Cir. 1989).
222. Warren v. City of Lincoln, 864 F.2d 1436 (8th Cir. 1989).
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cidents 2 s Warren's requests to see an attorney were denied,
and none of the police read him his rights pursuant to Miranda
v. Arzona.224 After Warren was booked, he posted bail and left
the jail. He was in custody for about two hours and forty
minutes.225
Warren brought an action alleging that the police officers
"violated his constitutional rights in contravention of the
fourth, fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments by falsely imprisoning him, denying him access to counsel, subjecting him
him, and
to harassing interrogation, fingerprinting
photographing him."' 226 At the close of Warren's case-in-chief,

the district court dismissed the action against one officer and
the city. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verofficers. Warren apdict in favor of the remaining two 2police
27
pealed the district court judgment.
A panel consisting of Johnson-appointee Judge Heaney,
Kennedy-appointee Senior District Court Judge Earl R. Larson 22 8 and conservative Judge Wollman unanimously reversed
and remanded the matter to the trial judge for a new trial.229
The panel held that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury on pretextual arrest,2 30 that the jury instructions
on post-arrest detention and qualified immunity were erroneous, 23 1 and that the district court improperly granted the

city's 23 2 and one police officer's motion to dismiss. 23 3 The city

petitioned for en banc review and its request was granted.23 4
The en banc majority disagreed with the original panel's reasoning. The en banc court concluded that Warren's detention
was lawful because probable cause existed to arrest him for attempted burglary and that his other grounds for recovery were
without merit.23 5 Judge Wollman, who apparently agreed with
223. Id. at 1437-38.
224. Id. at 1438. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

225. See Warren, 864 F.2d at 1438.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Judge Earl R. Larson is also a Johnson appointee.
229. Warren v. City of Lincoln, 816 F.2d 1254, 1255 (8th Cir. 1987), vacated and
reheard en bane, 864 F.2d 1437 (8th Cir. 1989).
230. Id. at 1259.
231. Id. at 1261.
232. Id. at 1263.
233. Id at 1259.
234. Warren v. City of Lincoln, 864 F.2d 1436 (8th Cir. 1989).
235. Id. at 1441.
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the original panel's view of the dispute, wrote the en banc
opinion.
The four liberals on the Circuit at the time 2 3 7 joined in a
dissent authored by Judge Heaney. Judge Heaney observed:
The majority holds that Police Officer Myers had probable
cause as a matter of law to arrest Warren for attempted burglary. It reaches this conclusion-even though Officer Myers conceded in district court that she did not have probable
cause to make such an arrest, even though the case was tried
in district court on the theory that no probable cause existed, and even though the issue of probable cause was not
presented to this Court on the initial appeal. In light of
these facts, and the fact that a reasonable jury could find
that probable cause did not exist, this Court is without the
authority to hold that there was probable cause to arrest
Warren for attempted burglary.23 8
Observation: This case involves a traditional political split between Democrats and Republicans-liberals and conservatives.
Conservatives are generally more hostile to civil rights plaintiffs and plaintiffs attacking government officials through section 1983 actions than are liberals. Therefore, the opinion is
consistent with the political philosophy of each group.
IX.

FREEDOM TO CONTRACT

239
Modern Computer Systems v. Modem Banking Systems

Modem Computer Systems, Inc. (MCS) appealed a district
court's denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction against
Modem Banking Systems, Inc. (MBS). MCS claimed that MBS
could not terminate MCS as its computer software distributor
or market software in MCS's exclusive sales territory. MCS al24 0
leged that violations of Minnesota's Franchise Act (Act)
24 '
committed by MBS necessitated injunctive relief.
24 2
Johnson-appointees Judges Heaney and Earl R. Larson
and conservative judge Magill did not agree on the question of
236. Id. at 1437.
237. The liberals are ChiefJudge Lay and Judges Heaney, Arnold and McMillian.
238. Id. at 1442 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
239. 858 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1988), vacated and reheard en banc, 871 F.2d 734 (8th
Cir. 1989).
240. See MINN. STAT. §§ 80C.01-.30 (1990).

241. Modern Computer Sys., 858 F.2d at 1340.
242. Senior District Judge, sitting by designation.
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whether the Act overrode a choice of law provision contained
in the contract between the parties to the dispute.243 The
Johnson appointees concluded that the Act should be applied,
holding that MCS showed a likelihood of success on the merits
of its claims under the Act. The panel reasoned that because
injunctive relief was the only remedy available for violations of
Minnesota law, the plaintiff's remedy would be meaningless if
preliminary relief was denied.244 Judge Magill dissented. He
observed:
Today the court concludes that the public policy of Minnesota overrides the choice of law provision agreed upon by
the parties. Because I believe that the majority has underestimated both the bargaining power [MCS] had when it
agreed to the terms of its franchising agreement with [MBS]
and the applicability of Tele-Save MerchandisingCo. v. Consum-

ers DistributingCo. to this case, I respectfully dissent.245
MBS petitioned for and was granted an en banc rehearing.
On rehearing, the en banc court voted 8-2246 rejecting the reasoning of the original panel and affirming the judgment of the
district court.2 4 7 Judge Magill, writing for the en banc court,
stated: "Our review of the record convinces us that [MCS]
failed to establish the irreparable injury required to necessitate
injunctive relief. Moreover, we agree that no fundamental
public policy of Minnesota overrides the choice of law provision agreed upon by the parties in the distributorship
2 48

agreement."
Judge Magill relied upon Tele-Save Merchandising Co. v. Consumers DistributingCo. ,249 a Sixth Circuit decision.

In Tele-Save, the Sixth Circuit upheld a choice of law pro243. The district court based its denial of [MCS's] motion on two findings.
First, it concluded that because of a choice of law clause in the [MCS-MBS]
contract, Nebraska law (not the [the Act]) must govern all disputes between
the parties arising from the contract. Second, the court found that [MCS]
failed to carry its burden to prove that [MBS's] actions caused the irreparable injury integral to any request for injunctive relief.
Modern Computer Sys. v. Modern Banking Sys., 871 F.2d 734, 735 (8th Cir. 1989)
(en banc).
244. Modern Computer Sys., 858 F.2d at 1345.
245. Id. at 1346 (Magill, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
246. Judge McMillian concurred in the majority opinion but did not participate in
the opinion's final vote due to illness.
247. Modern Computer Sys. v. Modern Banking Sys., 871 F.2d 734, 735 (8th Cir.
1989).
248. Id. at 737.
249. 814 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1987).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol17/iss3/3

44

Oliphant: En Banc Polarization in the Eighth Circuit
1991]

EN BANC POLARIZATION

vision in a supply agreement despite the existence of an
Ohio statute that (like the [Act]) includes a non-waiver provision. The court chose to enforce the choice of law provision for the following reasons: (1) the parties had agreed in
advance to the law to be applied in future disputes; (2) contacts between the parties were fairly evenly divided between
the state selected in the contract and the plaintiff's home
state; (3) the parties were not of unequal bargaining
strength; and (4) the application of the law chosen in the
contract was not repugnant to the public policy of the plaintiff's state.2 5 °
Johnson-appointees Judge Heaney and Chief Judge Lay
dissented.
Observation: The dispute appears to rest upon conflicting
views regarding the right to freely contract and the extent to
which government may intrude into that process. On that hypothesis, the outcome is predictable. The decision reflects the
philosophical gap between the Johnson and the Reagan
appointees.
X.

CIVIL RIGHTS

25
Manifold v. Blunt '

Missouri's Libertarian Party and several of its members
"challenged the constitutionality of Missouri's statutory requirement that new political parties certify their presidential
electors earlier than established parties. 2 5 2 The district court
denied their request for an injunction requiring the Missouri
Secretary of State to place their presidential and vice-presidential candidates on Missouri's 1988 ballot. A panel consisting of
conservatives, Judges Bowman and Magill, and Johnson-appointee Judge Heaney predictably disagreed. The conservatives, who formed the panel majority, rejected the
constitutional challenge.2 53 Judge Heaney's dissent contended
that neither of the rationales advanced by Missouri met the
strict scrutiny requirements of Anderson v. Celebrezze.254
250.
251.
110 S.
252.
253.
254.
having

Modern Computer Sys., 871 F.2d at 738.
863 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1988), reh'g denied, 873 F.2d 178 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
Ct. 242 (1989).
Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1375.
Id. at 1376 (Heaney, J., dissenting). The rationales set out by Missouri for
this earlier filing date were (1) assuring that capable and qualified people
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Following the panel decision, the Libertarian Party petitioned for en banc rehearing. The en banc request was denied,
a majority of active judges failing to vote to rehear the case.25
All of the liberals and conservative Judge Fagg voted to grant
an en banc rehearing. The four liberals joined in a dissent to
the Circuit's refusal to rehear the matter.2

56

Judge Heaney,

writing for the dissent, argued that, because Missouri failed to
meet its burden of justifying the earlier filing requirement, the
statute violated the2 57equal protection clause of the United
States Constitution.

Observation: Wide-spread participation in the political process, recognition of splinter political group participation in the
political process, and a willingness, sometimes an eagerness, to
achieve these goals by expanding the Constitution are a part of
a liberal's portfolio. Strict interpretation of statutes and constitutional provisions to uphold the intention of a democratically elected legislature is a part of a conservative's political
baggage. As this case illustrates, because conservative's control the Circuit, the Libertarian Party's failure to get an en banc
rehearing was predictable. Were Democrats, especially Johnson appointees, in control of the Circuit, the result would likely
have been different.
XI.

BANKRUPTCY

2 58
Bush v. Taylor

The issue before the panel in Bush v. Taylor was whether a
Chapter 7 debtor was entitled to a discharge of his ongoing
obligation under a state-court divorce decree, which required
that he remit to his former wife one-half of the payments he
received under a pension plan. The bankruptcy court denied
the discharge on two grounds. First, it reasoned that the prospective obligation to turn over a percentage of the pension
payments was not a "debt" subject to discharge. Second, it
believed that Taylor held his ex-wife's portion of the pension
serve as candidates in the "new" political party; and (2) serving the interest of efficiency. Id. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793-94 (1983).
255. The court apparently voted 5-5 on the en banc request. See Manifold v.
Blunt, 873 F.2d 178, 178 (8th Cir. 1989).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 179.
258. 893 F.2d 962 (8th Cir.), vacated and reheard en banc, 912 F.2d 989 (8th Cir.
1990).
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only as a constructive trustee. 25" The district court affirmed
the bankruptcy judge's ruling. 26 ° The Eighth Circuit, however,
in a 2-1 decision, reversed, holding that the obligation to remit
a portion of pension payments falls within the "broad and flex26
ible definition of debt under the Code."- 1
The majority panel opinion, written by Judge Arnold, reasoned that the obligation arose from a property settlement, a
type of debt that Congress chose not to exempt from discharge.262 Judge Arnold rejected a Ninth Circuit opinion
which held that pension payments not yet become due and
payable at the time of the bankruptcy petition did not represent dischargeable debts.2 6
He also rejected the district
court's alternative view that the debtor had been placed in a
fiduciary position by the divorce court so that he merely held
the pension payments for Bush's benefit, as a constructive
trustee for future payment. °4 Judge Arnold concluded that
Taylor's ongoing obligation to provide his ex-wife with onehalf of his pension was nothing more than a debt for property
settlement, the payment of which was not yet due.2 6 5
Judge Bowman vigorously dissented. He argued:
The Court's decision is indefensible. It permits a deadbeat husband to use the Bankruptcy Code's grace for honest debtors asa slick scheme for euchring his former wife
out of her 'sole and separate property' in one-half of the
benefits he receives under a pension plan. Under the
Court's decision, the former wife's entitlement to one-half
of the pension benefits-a property right established by judicial decree when the marriage was dissolved-becomes
merely another debt dischargeable in bankruptcy. The result is that, post-bankruptcy, the husband will enjoy 100
percent of the monthly pension benefits for as long as he
lives, and his ex-wife will be deprived forever of her half of
these benefits. Short of outright thievery, it is hard to imagine a more compelling case of unjust enrichment.
If I truly thought that Congress had commanded such a
bizarre and unjust result, I would join the Court's
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 964.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 963.
Id.
Id. at 964-66. See In re Teichman, 774 F.2d 1395, 1397-98 (9th Cir. 1985).
Bush, 893 F.2d at 966.
Id. at 966-67.
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opinion. 26 6
Bush petitioned and received an en banc rehearing. A majority in the en banc decision disagreed with the original panel
decision. Judge Bowman, writing for the majority, affirmed
both the bankruptcy and district courts' analyses of the problem. He stated:
We do not believe that Congress intended the Bankruptcy Code's grace for honest debtors to be used as Taylor
suggests, and Congress's actions with regard to federally
regulated pension plans suggest as much.... We doubt
that Congress ever intended that a former wife's judicially
decreed sole and separate property interest in a pension
payable to her former husband should be subservient to the
Bankruptcy Code's goal of giving the debtor a fresh start.26 7
Judge Arnold wrote the dissenting opinion and was joined by
ChiefJudge Lay and Judges John R. Gibson and Magill. He reemphasized that the issue before the court was one of statutory
interpretation, not of equity. 268 Additionally, he reasoned that
despite the inequitable result, the court should not have ignored the law as it was written.2 6 9
Observation: Of all the en banc decisions during the period
1989 to 1990, this decision is particularly surprising. If the en
banc court had agreed with the panel's original decision the
impact on traditional homemakers divorced within the Eighth
Circuit would have been dramatic. Therefore, the political/social implications were immense. From an abstract "justice"
perspective, allowing the debtor husband to discharge a marital property settlement obligation is unconscionable. Consequently, finding the liberal wing of any court arguing against a
broad public policy interpretation of a statute that protects a
large group of people from injustice-here, women in traditional marriages, is unusual.
Also, this case is interesting because it does not carry an immediate ideological label. The result finds a rare blend of
Johnson, Carter and Reagan appointees dissenting as a group.
The dissenters sound like traditional conservatives while the
conservative majority sounds like the Johnson liberals. Looking prospectively at this case, followers of the Eighth Circuit
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

967.
993-94.
994.
996.
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might have predicted a discharge by the conservative majority
because of the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code, along
the lines of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in a somewhat similar dispute.2 7 °
CONCLUSION

Most observers of the Eighth Circuit will agree that the result of this examination of two years en banc proceedings is
not surprising. Each judge's political party's perspectives are
reflected in his en banc decisions. Not surprising is the fact
that, in areas of major disagreement, the Circuit's decisions almost always fall on the Republican side of the ledger.2 7 '
Sometimes, however, the conservative perspective did not
prevail. This reinforces the suggestion made earlier that moderate midwestern Republican senators played a role in assurring that more moderate judicial appointments are made to the
Circuit.
What is unclear at this point is to what extent the conservative members on the Circuit are committed to leaving their
"ideological fingerprints" on key decisions.2

72

Clearly, how-

ever, they are having a pervasive "conservative" impact on federal law within the Circuit.
To those who do not follow the Circuit, some disputes
granted en banc review may not appear grist for such treatment. Ideologically, however, many of the three-judge panel
decisions that triggered en banc rehearings, those made by a
majority of Johnson or Johnson-Carter appointees, were inconsistent with the prevailing conservative majority's view of
the law. Consequently, there is some support for the claim
that most en banc proceedings are warranted because of the
existence or potential existence of intra circuit conflict. On the
other hand, the analysis also provides support for claims that
the conservative majority is sometimes using en banc rehear270. See In re Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 11l S. Ct. 507
(1990). The conservative majority on the Seventh Circuit used this precise reasoning
to allow a debtor husband to discharge a lien in bankruptcy. Judge Posner in dissent
charged that Sanderfoot had carried out a plan "designed to nullify (or perhaps to
complete the nullification of) the divorce decree and give the husband all rather than
half the marital property." "Today," wrote Judge Posner, "we place the crown of
success on this vicious scheme." Id. at 606 (Posner, J., dissenting).
271. See Wermiel, supra note 3, at 70.
272. See Note, supra note 4, at 864 n.2 (citation omitted).
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ings to overturn liberal panel decisions with which it simply
disagrees. The bottom line, however, is that a majority of en
banc proceedings seem to be serving their traditional
purpose.273

Also apparent in the analysis is that the Circuit's conservative judges consistently vote as a bloc with only a rare defector.
Occasionally a liberal, usually a Carter appointee, joins the
conservative vote.
The Circuit's liberal voices do not vote as a bloc in similar
fashion. The Carter liberals, Judges Arnold and McMillian,
quite often either join the conservative ranks or split between
Johnson and Reagan appointees. Like the conservatives, the
Johnson liberals, Chief Judge Lay and Judge Heaney almost
always vote as a bloc. Their voting behavior is in stark contrast
to the Carter liberals.
Some of the sharp language used in various opinions suggests that a rift exists between some members of the Circuit.274
In particular, the Johnson and Reagan appointees often find
themselves locked in fierce verbal combat. Their disputes provide the most conspicuous philosophical contrast and the best
evidence supporting the suggestion of an ideological
polarization.
A follower of the Circuit may question whether the Circuit
has become more of a "political institution" than a "legal institution.

' 27 5

The current analysis does not prove this. How-

ever, the ease with which an outcome is predictable in terms of
the Circuit's ideological alignment, the deadlocked ideological
gap between the Johnson and Reagan appointees, and the unwillingness to compromise among the members of the two
camps, raise troubling questions about the Circuit as an independent legal institution.
Followers of the Circuit's opinions may ponder, for example,
whether the judicial appointment process has become so heavily ideologically affiliated with a particular political partisan
view, that the judges can no longer be trusted to carry out the
273. See McFeeley, supra note 33, at 273-74; Solimine, supra note 23, at 33-38.
274. In reading some of the opinions, it seems that the language selected by the
judges is far sharper than necessary, even for good advocacy.
275. See Smith, supra note 3, at 134 (quoting Justice Blackmun's speech given at
the 1988 Eighth Circuit Judicial Conference).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol17/iss3/3

50

1991]

EN
POLARIZATION
Oliphant:
EnBANC
Banc Polarization
in the Eighth Circuit

essential functions of an independent judiciary in a free society, even with lifetime appointments.
A concern is that America's judiciary may have begun a slow
drift, with little notice, into becoming the ideological enforcement arm of the prevailing political party. In totalitarian societies, this has already happened. Such regimes direct the
judiciary to decide legal disputes in accordance with political
principles laid down by the government and the controlling
party. Clearly, in American society, that has not happened. As
this analysis suggests, however, choosing "pure" ideologues to
sit as judges over disputes involving citizens raises troublesome questions. The polarization in the Eighth Circuit suggests that alternative methods of appointing judges need to be
explored if the judiciary is to carry out its appropriate role in a
free society. 76
276. The suggested dangers to democracy are as great when a governor or a president undertake control of the appointive process, particularly if there is no check on
the process.
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